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A JUDICIAL DILEMMA: REAL OR
IMAGINED?,
FOREST JACKSON BOWMAN*
The use of words is to express ideas. Perspicuity requires not
only that ideas should be distinctly formed, but that they
should be expressed by words distinctly and exclusively appro-
priate to them. But no language is so copious as to supply
words and phrases for every complex idea, nor so correct as
not to include many equivocally denoting different ideas. THE
FEDERALIST, (No. 37) (J. Madison).
All construction is the ascertainment of meaning. And literal-
ness may strangle meaning. Felix Frankfurter, Utah Junk Co.
v. Porter, 328 U.S. 39, 44 (1945).
Look to the essence of a thing, whether it be a point of doc-
trine, or practice, or of interpretation. Marcus Aurelius, MEDI-
TATIONS VIII 22.
INTRODUCTION
Being a judge in West Virginia, as Thomas Hughes said of
life itself in Tom Brown's School Days, "isn't all beer and skit-
tles."1 West Virginia's judges2 are limited in their range of per-
* Associate Professor, West Virginia University College of Law; B.S., 1960,
West Virginia University; J.D., 1963, West Virginia University.
This article is the outgrowth of research conducted for a special committee of
The West Virginia Bar Association. I am grateful for the advice and assistance of
the other two members of that committee, Lee M. Kenna, Esquire, of Charleston,
and Harry E. Moats, Esquire, of Harrisville, and for the untiring efforts of Ms.
Anita Harold, West Virginia University College of Law, Class of 1981, who served
as my research assistant under a grant funded by the Arthur B. Hodges trust
fund.
Certain statements regarding the workings of the West Virginia Judicial
Council and the Governor's Committee on Crime, Delinquency and Corrections
are the result of personal knowledge acquired during my service as Secretary to
the Judicial Council and member of the Governor's Committee during the period
1975-1979.
T. HUGHEs, TOM BROWN'S SCHOOL-DAYs 31 (1886).
2 The term "judge" as used in this article, when referring to West Virginia
1
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missible activity by the West Virginia Judicial Code of Ethics,'
yet they must seek office in a partisan political election.4 They are
paid a salary that is modest by most objective standards,' yet
they are prohibited by the West Virginia Judicial Code of Ethics
from practicing law or engaging in many of the various activities
with which they could supplement their incomes.6 They are re-
quired to be "patient, dignified and courteous" to all with whom
they deal in their official capacities,7 yet they lack any effective
means of defending themselves from unjustified criticism and
attack."
judges, includes only judges of the Circuit Courts and justices of the Supreme
Court of Appeals.
3 Canon 7 of the West Virginia Code of Ethics has been extensively revised
by the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia, most recently on March 1,
1977. While the canon as revised gives a judge considerably more latitude with
respect to political activity than does Canon 7 of the Code of Judicial Conduct
drafted by the Special Committee on Standards of Judicial Conduct of the ABA, a
judge who must run for election on a partisan political ballot still faces severe
constraints as a practical matter.
4 W. VA. CONsT. art. VIII, § 5 provides in part that, "The legislature may
prescribe by law whether the election of such judges is to be on a partisan or
nonpartisan basis." Bills providing for the nonpartisan election of judges have
been introduced in the legislature since the ratification of the Judicial Reorganiza-
tion Amendment of 1974 (which first contained the language quoted above) but no
such legislation has been enacted. Notice that the Constitution of West Virginia
specifically requires election of judges, thus eliminating any consideration of ap-
pointment of judges under a merit plan.
1 As of April 1, 1980, West Virginia's Circuit Judges, receiving an annual sal-
ary of $35,000, ranked 37th among the fiftystates. West Virginia's Supreme Court
Justices, with an annual salary of $38,000, were tied with three other states for
44th place among the fifty states. This information was provided by the Honora-
ble Paul Crabtree, Administrative Director of the Supreme Court of Appeals of
West Virginia.
I Canon 5 of the West Virginia Judicial Code of Ethics places limitations on
judges' extra-judicial activities, including financial dealings. While Canon 5 of
West Virginia's Judicial Code of Ethics has been amended to provide considerably
more latitude than that allowed under Canon 5 of the ABA's Code of Judicial
Conduct, judges are still subject to extensive limitations with regard to their
financial conduct.
I Canon 3A(3) of the West Virginia Judicial Code of Ethics provides that: "A
judge should be patient, dignified, and courteous to litigants, jurors, witnesses,
lawyers, and others with whom he deals in his official capacity, and should require
similar conduct of lawyers, and of his staff, court officials, and others subject to his
direction and control."
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Now another inconsistency must be added to the list: West
Virginia's judges are permitted, if not encouraged, by the West
Virginia Judicial Code of Ethics to participate in activities and to
accept appointments dealing with the improvement of the law,
the legal system, or the administration of justice,9 but if they
choose to do so, they may be found to have vacated their judicial
offices! This inconsistency stems from a narrow interpretation of
the following language of article VIII, section 7, of the West Vir-
ginia Constitution:
No justice, judge or magistrate shall hold any other office,
or accept any appointment or public trust, under this or any
other government; nor shall he become a candidate for any
elective public office or nomination thereto, except a judicial
office; and the violation of any of these provisions shall vacate
his judicial office.
Each of the fifty states has some constitutional or statutory
provision barring judges from holding certain offices. In some in-
stances these limitations are quite narrowly drawn, as in Georgia,
where all officers drawing a salary from the state or from the
United States are barred from sitting in the state legislature;" or
in Texas, where judges are ineligible for the legislature; 1 or in
Maine, where judges are prohibited from sitting in either the
state legislature or the United States Congress or from holding
more than one of a number of designated offices.'2 In the majority
of states, however, the limitations are all-encompassing. Thus, for
example, South Carolina prohibits judges from holding another
"office or position of profit;"'1 Arizona renders a judge ineligible
to hold "any office or public employment other than a judicial
office or employment; 4 Colorado prohibits judges from holding
' Canon 4(C) of the W. VA. JUDICIAL CODE OF ETHics.
10 GA. CONST. § 2-1107.
"1 TEX. CONST. art. 3, § 19.
12 ME. CONST. art. IX, § 2.
's S.C. CONST. art. V, § 12. See also. ALAsKA CONST. art. IV, § 14; FLA. CONST.
art. 5, § 18; HAWAII CONST. art. V, § 3; N.J. CONsT. art. 6, § 7; and PA. CONST. art.
5, § 17.
14 ARIz. CONST. art. 6, § 11. The California Constitution has the same prohibi-
tion with nearly identical language, rendering judges ineligible for "public employ-
ment or public office other than judicial employment or judicial office." CAL.
CONST. art. VI, § 18.
1980]
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"any other public office;"'15 and New York bars judges from "any
other public office or trust."16
At common law, judges could not hold another office if the
duties of the other office were inconsistent with their duties as a
judge.17 The common law limitation and the constitutional limita-
tions which prohibit judges from holding another office evidence
two public policy concerns: (1) that judges not accept positions or
responsibilities which will interfere with their judicial duties, and
(2) that judges not be placed in the position of violating the con-
stitutional principle of separation of powers.1 8
Thus, in In re Richardson,"' the Court of Appeals of New
York found that service by judges as commissioners in proceed-
ings for the removal of the president of one of New York City's
boroughs would constitute acceptance of an "office" as prohibited
by the Constitution of the State of New York, since such service
would consume much of the judge's time and could involve the
judge in needless controversy. Speaking for the court, Chief Judge
Cardozo said, "[.t]he policy is to preserve the time of the judges
for the performance of their work as judges, and to save them
from the entanglements, at times the partisan suspicions, often
the result of other and conflicting duties. '20
In California, service by a judge on a "qualification board" to
consider qualifications of applicants for the office of county exec-
utive was found to be of a nature that would contravene the con-
stitutional limitation against a judge holding another office.21
Quoting Justice Cardozo in In re Richardson, the court said ser-
vice on the qualification board would take much of the judges'
time and would tend to involve judges in "entanglements" and
subject them to "partisan suspicions, of which the constitutional
limitation, in its wisdom, seeks to free them. '22 The rationale for
25 COLO. CONST. art. VI, § 18.
10 N.Y. CONST. art. 6, § 20.
17 State ex rel. Murphy v. Townsend, 72 Ark. 180, 79 S.W. 782 (1904); Wilson
v. King, 13 Ky. (3 Litt.) 467 (1823); Howard v. Harrington, 114 Me. 443, 96 A. 769
(1916).
2 Id.
19 247 N.Y. 401, 160 N.E. 655 (1928).
20 Id. at 420, 160 N.E. at 655.
"1 Abbot v. McNutt, 218 Cal. 225, 22 P.2d 510 (1933).
2 Id. at 230, 22 P.2d at 512.
[Vol. 83
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such a policy was "to exclude judicial officers from such extra-
judicial activities as may tend to militate against the free, disin-
terested and impartial exercise of their judicial functions. '2
On the other hand, granting to judges the authority to issue a
call for military aid to suppress a riot was not prohibited by New
York's constitutional provision since it did not "prohibit the exer-
cise of a function which is merely transient, occasional or inciden-
tal.' '24 The court said, "the performance of administrative duties
as to matters incidental to the exercise of judicial powers or which
have some reasonable connection with a judicial purpose has re-
peatedly been sanctioned.
25
Similarly, the New York Court of Appeals held that a judge
of that court could be empowered to pass upon the genuineness of
certain relics of General Washington, with a view to their
purchase by the state, since such a duty would not interfere with
the judge's judicial duties.26 In addition, the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts allowed judges to serve as members of
local draft boards by holding that Massachusetts' constitutional
provision barring judges from holding "any other office," in es-
sence "contemplates that a judge shall not accept any office or
position, governmental or other, which interferes with the per-
formance of his duties as a judge .... , 7 The court concluded
that membership on a local draft board was not a position which
would interfere with judicial duties.
I. THE WEST VIRGINIA DILEMMA
The issue has arisen in West Virginia as to whether a judge is
constitutionally permitted to serve on two organizations-the
West Virginia Judicial Council and the Governor's Committee on
Crime, Delinquency and Corrections. Both bodies are created by
statute2 18 and are concerned solely with improving the legal sys-
23 Id. at 229, 22 P.2d at 512.
24 People v. Bard, 209 N.Y. 304, 305, 103 N.E. 140, 141 (1913).
5 Id. at 306, 103 N.E. at 142.
26 People ex rel. Washington v. Nichols, 52 N.Y. 478 (1873).
27In re Opinion of the Justices, 307 Mass. 613, 621, 29 N.E.2d 738, 743 (1940)
(emphasis added).
28 The West Virginia Judicial Council legislation is embodied in W. VA. CODE
§§ 56-11-1 to -11 (Cum. Supp. 1980). The Governor's Committee on Crime, Delin-
quency and Corrections is West Virginia's name for the "state planning agency"
1980]
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tern and the administration of justice. The statutes establishing
both organizations require that the governor designate a certain
number of judges to serve on the organizations.
The West Virginia Judicial Council was created in 1933 "for
the continuous study of the organization, rules and methods of
procedure and practice of the judicial system of the state."2 The
council is required to "propose to the supreme court of appeals
such changes in the practice and procedure of the State as it shall
deem expedient,"30 and to "file with the governor prior to the
convening of the regular session of the legislature such proposals
for legislation as it may deem necessary for making the adminis-
tration of justice more efficient. '31 Members of the council receive
no compensation for their services.3 2
The West Virginia Judicial Council was an outgrowth of an
early twentieth century movement in this country to provide
some mechanism for the systematic and continuing study of the
operation of the courts and to recommend means of improving
them. The make-up of West Virginia's Judicial Council is fairly
representative of others throughout the country3 : one justice of
the supreme court of appeals, four circuit judges, four practicing
lawyers and one member of the faculty of the West Virginia Uni-
versity College of Law. At this time, the supreme court position
and one of the circuit judge positions are vacant. At least one su-
preme court justice and one circuit judge have declined appoint-
ment to the council due to concern over the problem raised by
alticle VIII, section 7, of the West Virginia Constitution.3'
The council has been inactive since April 1978. Prior to that
date, it usually met twice a year with each meeting lasting a few
hours.3 5 The council never made extensive demands on a judge-
provided for by 42 U.S.C. § 3723 (1977Y.
29 W. VA. CODE § 56-11-1 (Cum. Supp. 1980).
30 W. VA. CODE § 56-11-5 (Cum. Supp. 1980).
31 Id.
3' W. VA. CODE § 56-11-7 (Cum. Supp. 1980).
33 Nims, The Judicial Council: A Quarter Century of Progress, 35 A.B.A.J.
817 (1949); Winters, Silver Anniversary of the Judicial Council Movement (pts.
1&2), 33 J. OF Am. JUDICATURE Soc. 43, 79 (1949).
34 Personal knowledge of the author, who was Secretary of the Council from
3-8-75 to 7-15-79.
35 This information is found in the records of the judicial council, maintained
[Vol. 83
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member's time"6 and it did not become involved in "entangle-
ments." Indeed, it would be difficult to find positions less likely to
consume a significant part of a judge's time or more unlikely to
embroil judges in "entanglements" or "partisan suspicions" than
membership on the West Virginia Judicial Council. The function
of the council is that of a purely advisory body which does not
assume the role of advocate for the measures it recommends.
Likewise, the Governor's Committee on Crime, Delinquency
and Corrections requires little of a member's time and has for the
most part maintained a low profile. The Governor's Committee
functions under the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act
of 1968,37 which established a "state planning agency" under the
jurisdiction of the governor of the state. This agency was required
to be "representative of law enforcement agencies of the State
and of the units of general local government within the State."' 8
In 1976, the Act was amended to overcome criticism that such
agencies were largely police-dominated and were ignoring the ju-
dicial branch.39 The Act now provides:
The State planning agency shall include as judicial members,
at a minimum, the chief judicial officer or other officer of the
court of last resort, the chief judicial administrative officer or
other appropriate judicial administrative officer of the State,
and a local trial court judicial officer.... 'o
The West Virginia state planning agency created by the Act
was designated the "Governor's Committee on Crime, Delin-
quency and Correction" by Governor Hulett C. Smith in 1968.41
The committee meets monthly for about four hours, considers re-
quests for Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA)
Grants and votes on those grants. Little time is taken from the
in the office of the administrative director of the supreme court of appeals, who is
also, by statute, Secretary of the Judicial Council.
36 Id.
37 Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197 (1968) (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§
3701 to 3740 (1976)).
33 Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 203, 82 Stat. 199 (1968) (current version at 42 U.S.C.
§ 3723 (1976)).
3" S. REP. No. 94-847, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 17, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 5374, 5382.
40 42 U.S.C. § 3723 (1976).
4' Executive Order No. 14-68, August 21, 1968.
19801
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judge's performance of judicial duties, and the committee does
not become involved in "entanglements" or "partisan suspicions."
Although the committee is still functioning, it has become in-
creasingly difficult to secure the membership of judges because of
concern over the constitutional provision.
It seems reasonable to assume that the inclusion of judges in
the membership of both organizations, as mandated by statute, is
a reflection of the realization that judges are uniquely knowledge-
able of the working of the judicial system of the state and of the
problems and shortcomings in law enforcement and criminal jus-
tice. But the question looms: Is memberslip on the West Virginia
Judicial Council or the Governor's Committee on Crime, Delin-
quency and Corrections, or similar organizations, the type of ac-
tivity prohibited by article VIII, section 7, of the Constitution of
West Virginia-even though the "appointment" of judges was
mandated by the statute creating the organization?
11 THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF ARTICLE VIII, SECTION 7
While West Virginia's constitutional prohibition against a
judge holding another office is a part of the Judicial Reorganiza-
tion Amendment of 1974, the concept is not new to West Vir-
ginia's Constitution. The state's first constitution, ratified in 1863,
declared:
No Judge, during his term of service, shall hold any other of-
fice, appointment or public trust, under this or any other gov-
ernment, and the acceptance thereof shall vacate his judicial
office; nor shall he, during his continuance therein be eligible
to any political office.42
This provision was adopted without opposition by the consti-
tutional convention when the report of the convention's Commit-
tee on the Judiciary was considered. The only discussion on this
particular issue centered on a successful motion to add the words
"under this or any other government" foll6wing the word "trust."
There was no debate or discussion regarding the principle itself or
the use of the words "office, appointment or public trust. '48
41 W. VA. CONST. of 1863, art. VI, § 12.
43 2 DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIRST CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF
WEST VIRGINIA 894 (1861-1863).
[Vol. 83
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When the Constitution of 1872 was adopted, the prohibition
was expanded to bar judges from practicing law. Otherwise, it re-
mained the same:
No judge, during his term of office, shall practice the profes-
sion of law or hold any other office, appointment or public
trust, under this or any other government, and the acceptance
thereof shall vacate his judicial office. Nor shall he, during his
continuance therein, be eligible to any political office."
As in the First Constitutional Convention, there was no de-
bate or discussion on the adoption of this provision by the Consti-
tutional Convention.
For 102 years this language remained unaltered in the Con-
stitution of West Virginia. The Judicial Reorganization Amend-
ment of 1974 added the prohibition against a judge becoming a
candidate for a nonjudicial office, an addition clearly designed to
reduce the attractiveness of a judicial position as a stepping stone
to higher political office. 5
The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia has never
addressed the issue directly. However, in Old Dominion Building
and Loan Association v. Sohn," a 1903 case involving the sale of
real estate wherein the deed was acknowledged before a notary
public who had accepted the office of judge of the criminal court
of the county, the court said that the two offices were "incompati-
ble" and that the notary had vacated his office by accepting the
judgeship. There was no inquiry into the question of whether the
position of notary public was an "office" since individuals from
Alabama and New York were presented, "both solemnly deciding
"' W. VA. CONST. of 1872, art. VIII, § 17. This section was later redesignated §
16 by a constitutional amendment ratified on October 12, 1880. There was no
change in the substance of the section.
"I It is questionable, however, whether such a prohibition can mean much to
one who is insistent upon using a judgeship as a platform for attaining political
notoriety. A judgeship can provide a relatively safe, salaried platform at least until
the judge-politician becomes a declared candidate for a nonjudicial office. The
only effective means of preventing judicial positions from being converted into
personal political empires is prompt, forceful and stringent action against such
politicos through the judicial disciplinary machinery of the state and the enforce-
ment of this discipline by the Supreme Court of Appeals, including, when neces-
sary, enforcement of discipline against its own members.
46 54 W. Va. 101, 46 S.E. 222 (1903).
1980]
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that a notary public is an officer.' 47 However, the court did raise
the issue of separation of powers, stating that "the offices of no-
tary public and judge may be incompatible under article 5 of the
Constitution of West Virginia, declaring that the legislative, exec-
utive and judicial departments shall be separate and distinct, and
that no person shall exercise the powers of more than one of them
at the same time . . . 48
The separation of powers argument is a compelling argument
when considered, as here, on a "personal" basis, that is to say,
when the appointment of a judge to a nonjudicial position in-
volves the appointment of an individual without regard to
whether that individual is a judge. However, when the appoint-
ment of a judge to a nonjudicial position is made pursuant to a
statute which mandates the appointment of a judge, this argu-
ment loses much of its force, for in such an instance, the judge
sits in the nonjudicial position, not by virtue of his personal ap-
pointment to the position but simply by virtue of being a judge.49
In Old Dominion,"0 the appointment involved was a "personal"
one, and not one made because the individual was a judge. There-
fore acceptance of the appointment clearly violated the separa-
tion of powers doctrine. However, had the appointment been
based solely on the individual's position as a judge, i.e., a pre-
requisite to the appointment, a subsequent acceptance would not
have violated the doctrine of separation of powers.
The question remains whether a judge's acceptance of an
"appointment" to the Judicial Council or to the Governor's Com-
mittee is the acceptance of an "office, ... appointment or public
trust" prohibited under article VIII, section 7 of the West Vir-
47 Id. at 116, 46 S.E. at 228.
48 Id. at 114, 46 S.E. at 227.
49 This was precisely what the Supreme Court of Nevada found when a dis-
trict judge was appointed "town site trustee" under a Nevada statute making dis-
trict judges town site trustees. The court said the position of town site trustee was
in no sense personal to the person sitting as district judge and that he sat only by
virtue of the statute making district judges town site trustees. The court held that
the service as town site trustee by the judge did not violate the principle of sepa-
ration of powers. State ex rel. Jennett v. Stevens, 34 Nev. 128, 116 P. 601 (1911).
- 54 W. Va. 101, 46 S.E. 222 (1903).
[Vol. 83
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III. DEFINING THE RELEVANT TERMS
A. What is an "Appointment"?
Appointment is defined as "the designation of a person by
the person or persons having authority therefore to discharge the
duties of some office or trust."5' 1 In this sense, of course, appoint-
ment is a verb. As a noun, appointment has been held to be a
synonym for office.52
B. What is a "Public Trust"?
Public Trust has generally been defined synonymously with
office. In Ex Parte Yale,53 the California Supreme Court stated
that "the terms 'office' and 'public trust' in the Constitution are
nearly synonymous; at least the term 'public trust' is included in
the more comprehensive term 'office.' " The terms "have rela-
tion only to those persons and duties that are of a public
nature."55
C. What is an "Office"?
Generally, "an 'office' is a public station or employment, con-
ferred by appointment of government, and embraces the idea of
tenure, duration, emolument, and duties."56 The word office im-
plies "a delegation of a portion of the sovereign power to the per-
son filling the office."'57 Synonyms include post, appointment, sit-
uation, place, and position.58
In Wilentz ex rel. Golat v. Stanger,59 the New Jersey Su-
preme Court held that an "office," within the rule that one occu-
pying an office vacates it upon acceptance of another office incom-
51 Seattle Ass'n. of Credit Men v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 188
Wash. 635, 639, 63 P.2d 359, 360 (1936).
"2 Ex Parte Yale, 24 Cal. 241, 243 (1864).
53 Id.
54 Id. at 243.
:5 Id. at 243-44.
" Thomas v. Sitton, 213 Ark. 816, 820, 212 S.W.2d 710, 712 (1948).
State v. Martens, 141 Fla. 666, 670, 193 So. 835, 837 (1940).
" Frazier v. Elmore, 180 Tenn. 232, 238, 173 S.W.2d 563, 565 (1943).
129 N.J.L. 606, 30 A.2d 885 (1943).
1980]
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patible therewith, "is the right, authority, and duty created and
conferred by law, by which, for a given period, an individual is
invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of the gov-
ermnent, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public." 60
After noting that it is often difficult to determine whether a
position is an "office" or a "mere employment," the Supreme
Court of Delaware stated:
Generally speaking, and each case must necessarily depend
upon its own facts, a state office embraces the right to exercise
a state function or employment, and to take the fees and emol-
uments belonging thereto. It not only involves the °conception
of tenure, power, duration, oath, fees and emoluments but also
the authority and duty to exercise some part of the sovereign
power of the state either in making, administering or executing
the laws of the State."
The Supreme Court of Tennessee, in holding that a county
judge who was inducted into the United States Army held an "of-
fice of trust or profit" under the United States within the prohibi-
tion of the Tennessee Constitution, 2 succinctly summarized this
area:
The term 'office', in its context, must be given broad meaning,
so as to effectuate the apparent intent of the constitutional
prohibition against a diversion or division of the time and la-
bor, energies and abilities of judges of our courts, which might
destroy, or diminish their capacity to discharge the exacting
duties of their responsible positions .... 63
In analyzing the foregoing case law, it would appear, then,
that the test for whether this position is an "office" within the
constitutional prohibition against judicial officers holding other
"offices" hinges on whether the position:
(1) involves the exercise of a portion of the sovereign
power of the state;
(2) involves functions that are more than merely "tran-
sient, occasional or accidental"; or
(3) may reasonably tend to interfere with the due ad-
6o Id. at 614-15, 30 A.2d at 891.
61 State ex rel. Biggs v. Corley, 36 Del 135, 144-45, 172 A. 415, 419 (1934).
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ministration of the law.
IV. WHAT DOES IT ALL MEAN?
One of the basic principles of statutory construction, noscitur
a sociis, which means that "associated words are of assistance in
determining the exact meaning to be given to a certain word,""
contemplates that where two or more words of similar meaning
are employed together in a statute, they are understood to be
used in a cognate sense, to express the same relations, and to give
color and expression to each other. Thus, utilizing this principle,
when the West Virginia Constitution speaks of "any other office,
*.. appointment or public trust,' '6 5 it is speaking of one and the
same thing. As shown earlier, office, appointment, and public
trust are synonymous terms.
Participation by a judge in an organization such as the West
Virginia Judicial Council or the Governor's Committee on Crime,
Delinquency and Correction clearly does not fall within the com-
monly accepted definitions of office, appointment or public trust
as those terms have been defined by the courts under statutes
and constitutions prohibiting judges from holding other offices.
Such participation does not:
(1) interfere with the judges' judicial duties;
(2) involve judges in "entanglements" and "partisan
suspicions;"
(3) involve the exercise of the sovereign power of the state; or
(4) come to the judge personally, instead of merely by virtue
of being a judge.
Whether an appointment to the Judicial Council or the Gov-
ernor's Committee or a similar organization involves the accept-
ance of a position which is incompatible with a judicial position
(regardless of how it is defined) has never been decided by the
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia. However, that court
has ruled on the question of incompatibility of offices under arti-
cle VIII, section 4 of the Constitution of West Virginia which pro-
vides that "None of the executive officers mentioned in this arti-
cle shall hold any office during the term of his service." In 1948,
in ruling that a person holding a temporary commission in the
People v. Goldman, 7 IMI. App. 3d 253, 254, 287 N.E.2d 177, 178 (1972).
65 W. VA. CONsT. art. VIII, § 7 (emphasis added).
1980]
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Army is not ineligible under section 4 to serve as Attorney Gen-
eral, the court stated:
We do not believe the question of incompatibility of of-
fices, as defined at common law, arises in this proceeding.
There is a conflict in the authorities as to what constitutes in-
compatibility in offices. In some jurisdictions it is held that
such incompatibility exists when it is physically impossible
that the duties of both offices be performed properly by the
same person. But the weight of authority supports the conclu-
sion reached in the case of Bryan v. Cattell, wherein it is held
that incompatibility rests not upon physical inability to per-
form the duties of both offices, but arises from the inconsistent
nature of the offices and their relation to each other, rendering
it improper, from considerations of public policy for one per-
son to perform the duties of both. We adhere to the holding in
Bryan v. Cattel. The duties of Attorney General of the State
of West Virginia and those of a commissioned officer in the
Army of the United States are not inconsistent and are so di-
vergent that no incompatibility therein will occur.
We believe that the common law principles relating to in-
compatibility of offices have been supplemented but not dis-
placed by pertinent provisions of the Constitution of this State
inhibiting one person from holding more than one office at the
same time.
In our own jurisdiction a liberal view with respect to eligi-
bility to office has been adopted as appears from the following:
'The right of a citizen to hold office is the general rule; ineligi-
bility the exception. Courts are hesitant to take action result-
ing in deprivation of the privilege to hold office, except under
clear and explicit constitutional or statutory requirement.' 0
In addition, the Attorney General of West Virginia has ren-
dered a formal opinion that a judge may be employed by an in-
terim committee of the Legislature and paid a reasonable amount
to compile all the laws relating to children. 67
The supreme court decision and the opinion of the Attorney
General both suggest that judges who accept "appointments" to
Thomas v. Wysong, 125 W. Va. 369, 373-77, 24 S.E.2d 463, 466-68 (1943)
(citations omitted).
0? 45 0 p. Att'y Gen. 449 (1953).
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the West Virginia Judicial Council and the Governor's Committee
on Crime, Delinquency and Corrections, and similar organizations
do not thereby vacate their judicial offices since such appoint-
ments do not involve incompatible offices. Moreover, such an in-
terpretation would be consistent with another principle of tatu-
tory construction which has application to this issue-the
presumption against absurdity in the construction of statutes or
constitutional provisions. As the Supreme Court of Appeals of
West Virginia has put it, "[W]here, as here, a literal application
of the language used in the statute would lead to an absurd re-
sult, it is our duty to construe the statute so as to avoid such
result and adopt a reasonable construction."' 5 Moreover, "a stat-
ute may be construed contrary to its literal meaning when a lit-
eral construction would result in an absurdity or inconsistency,
and the words are susceptible of another construction which will
carry out the manifested intention of the Legislature." s Indeed,
the court has a duty to avoid absurdity in the construction of
statutes, if such construction can be avoided.70
Viewing membership affirmatively, it is evident that partici-
pation in these organizations assists judges in carrying out the
mandate of Canon 4 of the West Virginia Judicial Code of Ethics.
Canon 4 provides:
He (i.e., the judge) may serve as a member, officer, or director
of an organization or governmental agency devoted to the im-
provement of the law, the legal system, 'or the administration
of justice. He may assist such an organization in raising funds
and may participate in their management and investment, but
:8 McLaughlin v. Morris, 128 W. Va. 456, 461, 37 S.E.2d 85, 88 (1946).
9 Old Dominion Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Sohn, supra 54 W.Va. 101, 112, 46
S.E. 222, 226 (1903).
70 Parsons v. County Court, 92 W. Va. 490, 115 S.E. 473 (1922); State v. Mor-
ris, 129 W. Va. 456, 37 S.E.2d 85 (1946). The presumption against absurdity is an
old principle and not something that courts have only recently seized upon to
"legislate." As far back as 1837 an English court said:
The rule by which we are to be guided in construing acts of Parliament
is to look at the precise words, and to construe them in their ordinary
sense, unless it would lead to any absurdity or manifest injustice; and if
it should, so to vary and modify them as to avoid that which it certainly
could not have been the intention of a legislature should be done.
Perry v. Skinner, 2 M.&W. 471, 476 (1837). Today this principle is so well estab-
lished as to be known as the "Golden Rule" of statutory construction. NtrrrG &
DICKENSON, CASES & MATERALS ON LEGISLATION 515-516 (1978).
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should not personally participate in public fund raising activi-
ties. He may make recommendations to public and private
fund-granting agencies on projects and programs concerning
the law, the legal system, and the administration of justice.
Indeed Canon 4C reads as if it were describing the duties of
the members of the West Virginia Judicial Council and the Gov-
ernor's Committee on Crime, Delinquency and Corrections. The
commentary to Canon 4 is even more compelling:
As a judicial officer and person specially learned in the law, a
judge is in a unique position to contribute to the improvement
of the law, the legal system, and the administration of justice,
including revision of substantive and procedural law and im-
provement of criminal and juvenile justice. To the extent that
his time permits, he is encouraged to do so, either indepen-
dently or through a bar association, judicial conference, or
other organization dedicated to the improvement of the law.70 1
Interpreting West Virginia Constitution article VIII, section
7 literally and holding that a West Virginia judge cannot serve on
organizations such as the Judicial Council and the Governor's
Coramittee, in light.of the clear mandate of the West Virginia Ju-
dicial Code of Ethics and in view of an understanding of what
this constitutional prohibition is actually intended to prevent,
would lead to an absurdity. The constitutional prohibition was
enacted with a single purpose in mind-to keep judges out of
politics and to keep them at the business of judging. Any con-
struction of the constitutional provision which would prevent
judges from performing one of their more valuable func-
tions-sharing judicial expertise for the good of the system of jus-
tice-would result in an absurdity.
Finally, there is persuasive evidence that the West Virginia
Legislature has interpreted the constitutional prohibition as al-
lowing judges to serve on the West Virginia Judicial Council. Af-
ter the Judicial Reorganization of 1974 eliminated courts of lim-
ited jurisdiction in West Virginia, the code section setting forth
the membership in the West Virginia Judicial Council was
amended to eliminate judges of the "courts of limited jurisdic-
7O 1 (Emphasis added).
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tion" from membership on the Council.71 This statutory change
was made without any question having been raised as to the pro-
priety of judges sitting on the Council and, indeed, the change
would have been a futile act had not the Legislature interpreted
the West Virginia constitutional provision to permit judges to
serve on the Judicial Council.
As the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia stated in
1906:
In construing statutes, courts must presume knowledge on the
part of the legislature, of the provisions of the organic law of
the state, relating to the subject matter thereof, as well as of
the principles of the common law, and will not impute to that
body any intention to obstruct or impede the operation of con-
stitutional provisions, or to innovate upon the settled policy of
the law.7 2
V. CONCLUSION
What the "settled policy of the law" is, is oftentimes open to
question, and we will not know to a certainty what the Supreme
Court of Appeals of West Virginia will do with the constitutional
provision at hand until the court should rule on the matter. How-
ever, the interpretation suggested by this article appears clear:
service by a West Virginia judge on the West Virginia Judicial
Council or the Governor's Committee on Crime, Delinquency and
Correction, or a similar organization does not cause the judge to
vacate his seat under the provisions of article VIII, section 7, of
the West Virginia Constitution.
"I W. VA. CODE § 56-11-4 (1966).
71 Quoting Syllabus pt. 5, Webb. v. Ritter, 60 W. VA. 193, 54 S.E. 484 (1906).
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